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Abstract 
This contribution investigates the strategies that environmental agencies develop to enhance their policy autonomy, in 
order to fulfil their organisational missions for protecting the environment. This article asks whether there are 
particular strategic moves that an agency can make to augment this policy autonomy in the face of the principals. 
Critiquing principal agent theory, it investigates the evolution of three environmental agencies (the European 
Environment Agency, the England and Wales Environment Agency and the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency), focusing on the case study of climate change. The contribution examines how the agencies influence 
environmental policy on domestic, regional and global levels, with a special focus on the principals that constrain 
agency autonomy. A greater focus on different multi-level contexts, which the three agencies face, may create other 
possible dynamics and opportunities for agency strategies. Agencies can use particular knowledge, network and alliance 
building to strengthen their policy/political positions. 
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1. Introduction 
This contribution has a twofold analytical purpose. 
First, it studies environment agencies as prototypical 
public organisations wielding policy expertise and 
struggling with some of the most critical public policy 
questions affecting human well-being. Part of the gov-
ernance challenge facing such agencies is the blurring 
of the line between the expertise needed to govern a 
policy problem and the political knowledge needed to 
govern most effectively. This governance difficulty is 
heightened by the multi-level nature of the political ac-
tors involved and the increasing presence of “wicked” 
problems (policy problems resisting resolution due to 
issue uncertainty and complexity). Problem-solving ex-
pertise is not the only knowledge that agencies must 
nurture: how agencies handle multiple masters mat-
ters. This contribution emphasises that a necessarily 
important part of this governance effort involves de-
veloping strategies that engage the agency’s principals 
and constituencies.  
Secondly, exploring these policy-making aspects sug-
gests the need to conceptually broaden the principal-
agent (PA) framework. The article examines the role that 
agent strategies can have in influencing the PA dynam-
ic, and which strategic moves may succeed in providing 
the agency the policy scope to fulfil its core tasks. Haw-
kins and Jacoby (2006, p. 201) stress how PA theory 
has overlooked the importance of agent strategies in 
the policies that ensue. This raises the broader theoret-
ical question largely absent from traditional PA ap-
proaches, namely assessing the importance of learning.  
To achieve these objectives, we ask the following 
research question: are there particular strategic moves 
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that an agency can make to enhance its policy auton-
omy with respect to the principals? The article explores 
the ability of agencies to learn strategies for engaging 
with both the principals and the other constituencies 
(those elements of society that are regulated and/or 
benefit from agency efforts). This article makes a fo-
cused comparison of the multi-level dynamics within 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) in 
the area of environmental policy, focusing particularly 
on climate change (CC). It investigates the policy efforts 
of the EU agency, the European Environment Agency 
(EEA) and the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA). However, given the importance of 
domestic agencies in implementing EU law and gov-
ernance (part of a “double delegation” where regulato-
ry powers have been delegated both to the EU institu-
tions and national agencies) we need to understand 
the transposition of EU law at the domestic level and 
its own PA dynamics (Coen & Thatcher, 2008; Trondal, 
2011, p. 58). The study adds the Environment Agency 
for England and Wales (EA) to the methodological ap-
proach discussed next. 
1.1. Methods and Outline 
In 2007, the Leverhulme Foundation funded a one year 
qualitative study enabling this researcher to examine 
three environmental agencies and the challenges that 
they face in the new millennium. The USEPA and the 
EEA were selected on the most different principle with 
respect to the question of policy scope (i.e., the power 
and authority to implement environmental law) within 
a multi-level context. Although both agencies operate 
in a multi-level dynamic, the USEPA has a substantially 
greater budgetary and regulatory scope over the US 
state-level agencies; in contrast, the EEA is an infor-
mation-focused agency that relies on networks of na-
tional institutions and agencies to perform its policy 
role and has limited policy/budgetary scope over them. 
If we saw these two agencies following a similar strate-
gy towards their principals in order to enhance policy 
control, this suggests a broader phenomenon is being 
observed. However, given the importance of under-
standing how member state agencies operate in the 
multi-level EU context, I drilled down further, adding 
the EA as an illustration. Given the ability to only look 
at one member state country, the EA was selected as 
the largest member state agency with considerable 
policy and information gathering responsibilities, oper-
ating within a member state government that originally 
took a very limiting perspective towards the EEA. 
The initial study revealed that changes in executive 
government and legislatures mattered in shaping 
agency policy autonomy; to understand this time di-
mension, the author has continued the study into 
2014. The research has involved examining the en-
gagement with other organisations within the system 
and the instruments (policy tools) selected to imple-
ment environmental legislation. This has involved look-
ing at academic literature, primary documents, (includ-
ing annual reports, external assessments, and policy 
proposals), and conversations with expert academics. 
To get a detailed sense of the motivations and the de-
gree to which implicit/explicit strategies existed, this 
researcher has utilised open-ended questionnaires to 
interview 78 organisational actors experienced in envi-
ronmental policy-making, both within the particular 
agency and outside it. The interviews include three 
senior and four mid-level EEA officers, three consult-
ants involved in EEA activities, three EEA Management 
Board members representing EU supranational institu-
tions, four senior EA officials, five mid-level EA officials, 
three policy officers in the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) and the Department of Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), three senior 
EPA political appointees, ten senior EPA permanent 
administrators, 27 EPA Headquarters policy officers, 8 
USEPA Region policy officers, 8 policy officers in other 
departments (e.g., Office of Management and Budget 
and the Small Business Administration), four policy of-
ficers representing regulated groups and two Environ-
ment Canada officials. 
In terms of data gathering, the investigation has fo-
cused on the evolution of the three agencies’ effort to 
shape policy broadly and to engage with their respec-
tive principals. However, to more closely understand 
the organisational level mechanics (of building policy 
efforts, strategies and instruments), this article drills 
down further by selecting a specific policy problem, 
climate change. This allows closer isolation of the micro 
differences in policy preferences, and in information, 
between the principal and agent. In terms of the ana-
lytical propositions the next section examines, climate 
change is a testing case for the theoretical argument 
because of (a) its high political salience, (b) the degree 
of policy uncertainty and complexity inherent in the 
problem and (c) a wide range of actors perceiving a 
stake and being willing to contest this policy area. Be-
cause climate change policy encompasses so many en-
vironmental and non-environmental policy dimensions 
that are pursued within and outside the respective en-
vironment agencies, the project has focused on water 
policy issues and the most salient CC dockets (in terms 
of political attention) for each agency.  
The next section formulates a number of theoreti-
cal propositions based on PA theory as well as two lit-
eratures that suggest critical changes: namely historical 
institutionalism and learning. The following section ex-
plores each agency’s development, focusing on how 
the agencies have evolved in their relationship with 
their principals to achieve policy objectives. The article 
then examines the degree of policy autonomy found in 
the individual agency’s CC policy efforts.  
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2. Theoretical Overview 
2.1. Principal-Agent Approaches 
The foundational PA literature focused on the core re-
lationships between bureaucratic organisations (the 
agents) and the principals, the political authorities. PA 
theorists conceptualised politicians as principals who 
anticipate the potential for bureaucratic manipulation 
(given the bureaucracy’s superior expertise) and assert 
their long-term control over the agent (McCubbins, 
Noll, & Weingast, 1987). The traditional PA approach 
assumes that bureaucrats have personal preferences 
that conflict with the principals’ concerns, and the del-
egation of authority gives bureaucrats/agents infor-
mation advantages—i.e., expertise (McCubbins et al., 
1987, pp. 246-247). To avoid prohibitively costly moni-
toring and sanctioning costs, the principals build mech-
anisms that control the bureaucratic process, but do 
not require specifying or even knowing the detailed 
policy outcomes that bureaucrats pursue (Calvert, 
McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989, pp. 598-599). This can 
involve: selection or screening of the agent, embedding 
positive incentives, monitoring procedures and sanc-
tioning (Reichert & Jungblut, 2007). This article’s null 
hypothesis is the PA thesis: the policy actions that 
agencies pursue fall within the policy autonomy and 
discretion delegated by the principals (Conceição-
Heldt, 2013; see Table 1 for the summary list). Policy 
autonomy is the actual (as opposed to the merely for-
mal/legal) degree of policy-making competency an 
agency enjoys in relation to its “parent” ministry or 
government (Bach, Niklasson, & Painter, 2012, p. 185). 
In the PA perspective, the tension arises as the 
asymmetric balance of information between the prin-
cipal and the agent, involving incompletely specified 
mandate or weak oversight mechanisms, creates the 
potential for agency slack (the ability to act inde-
pendently and to exceed the delegated authority 
granted by the principals) (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & 
Tierney, 2006). Thus, the traditional PA approach posits 
certain conditions where agencies may exert policy au-
tonomy that is contrary to the principal’s intentions. 
This agency slack occurs in conditions where the agen-
cy interests and consequent actions conflict with the 
principal (shirking) or where the structure of delegation 
gives incentives for the agency to take a different posi-
tion (slippage) (Conceição-Heldt, 2013).  
One of the most likely opportunities for agency 
slippage occurs when (a) the principle is a collective en-
tity that must generate consensus to act and is divided; 
or (b) there are multiple principals (Thatcher & Stone-
Sweet, 2002). Not only can the agent play off the mul-
tiple actors (when they are unable to agree a common 
interest or agree to sanction the agent), the agency will 
be alert to the principals’ decisional process, i.e., 
whether the principals require unanimity versus some 
form of majority vote to alter agency behaviour. These 
multiple actors may also have authority over different 
aspects of the principal’s relationship. Koop (2011) 
finds that an increased number of principals involved 
in setting the agency’s terms leads to greater prob-
lems of achieving compromise, a higher tendency for 
less detailed legislation and more opportunities for 
discretion.  
Part of this slippage dynamic reflects a wider range 
of public and societal actors involved in governing. 
Governance networks, in which a mixture of state ac-
tors (which may include both the principals and multi-
ple agents working on the same policy problem) and 
societal actors, have an increasing role (Coen & 
Thatcher, 2008). Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2008, p. 15) 
push this argument further by stressing the possibility 
that actors can be both principals and agents simulta-
neously, creating more complex dynamics. 
A second set of conditions that complicate the PA 
perspective are the characteristics inherent in the poli-
cy that the agency confronts. First, there is the ques-
tion of how salient (the degree of importance given an 
issue by policy makers) the policy is that the agency is 
acting upon; the more politically salient the policy, the 
more likely principals will invest in monitoring and 
steering (Koop, 2011). Second, agency policy autonomy 
may depend on the stage that the policy is at: the acts 
of agenda setting, policy formulation, policy decision, 
policy implementation and policy monitoring may at-
tract varying degrees of principal attention (Bach et al., 
2012). 
2.2. Institutional Strategies and Learning 
The elaborations offered above do not challenge the 
essential PA dynamics. Some critics argue for the im-
portance of other dynamics that move beyond PA as-
sumptions. Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) raise the 
historical institutionalist argument that PA assumptions 
become problematic over time as preferences of both 
the principals and agents can change and complex in-
teractions feed back into this process. Coen and 
Thatcher (2008, pp. 53-54) argue that the PA approach 
too easily ignores how, over time, the post-delegation 
behaviour may alter the original delegation, “driven by 
endogenous factors such as learning or the develop-
ment of expertise, or exogenous factors such as tech-
nological and economic developments or external co-
ercion”. Exogenous technological factors may involve 
the creation of information technology that enhances 
policy scope but cannot be anticipated by the princi-
pals in earlier legislation. While accepting the potential 
importance of exogenous factors in enhancing policy 
autonomy, this contribution focuses on the endoge-
nous dynamics, explored next.  
Hawkins and Jacoby (2006, p. 199) note that the PA 
focus on the principal’s control mechanisms has led to 
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the consequent neglect of the strategies that agents 
pursue in between the act of delegation and the actual 
policy outcomes. They posit that agents are able to in-
crease their autonomy by three strategies outlined be-
low. First, agents can embrace strategies that involve a 
certain level of deception or mis-direction. One plausi-
ble way is “dualism”, i.e., creating a covert buffer be-
tween the agent and the principal by differentiating 
between core tasks that the agency wishes to fulfil and 
the actual tasks that please the principals and other 
third party constituents (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006, pp. 
210-211). Particularly when facing multiple demands 
and a growing number of principals and other interest-
ed parties, agencies may have the ability to loosely 
couple sufficient activity to please certain principals 
whilst operating to achieve objectives not pleasing to 
these particular principals. 
Less covert is the second strategy. Agents can 
choose to reinterpret the delegation rules by (a) grad-
ually but visibly reinterpreting the rules in a way that 
gives the principal time to adapt and not be goaded in-
to overturning the reinterpretation; (b) reinterpreting 
the rules in a way that splits the collective/multiple 
principles; (c) adhering to the principal’s goals but 
modifying/innovating the implementation in a manner 
that establishes future precedents; and (d) developing 
informal practices that the agent asks to be formalised 
(Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006, pp. 206-207, 212).  
These strategic possibilities of reinterpretation 
suggest a larger reality: agencies may find the scope 
to alter the substantive preferences of the principals 
and other important stakeholders over time. This 
does not constitute shirking as the agency acts to 
transform the policy dynamics and the principals’ 
preferences. The difference is that shirking is the ex-
plicit effort to circumvent the will of the principal as 
expressed in the PA control mechanisms; this has 
democratic implications given the circumvention of 
democratic representatives. The preference transfor-
mation involves the persuasion of the principal on a 
voluntary basis to accept new understandings of policy. 
Tallberg (2002, pp. 37-39) argues that there is an in-
herent element of learning in any principal-agent rela-
tionship. PA relationships are not “one-shot affairs”: 
both principals and agents seek to integrate previous 
experience with future behaviour. This article goes fur-
ther by postulating that agencies can adjust and have 
the ability to make principals adjust over time through 
a learning process. 
Hawkins and Jacoby suggest a third agency strategy 
involving third parties. PA theory acknowledges this 
possibility, with these groups acting as monitors for the 
principal that trigger alarms about agency shirking. 
However, the dynamic also works in reverse. As auton-
omous agents that are supposed to be open to policy 
stakeholders, it is difficult to stop agents from expand-
ing the range of actors that they engage. Such monitor-
ing stakeholders may share or be persuaded to adopt 
the agency outlook, building coalitions to support the 
agent’s policy efforts (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006, pp. 
208-209). Agencies have incentives to ally themselves 
with principals and other interested parties who share 
their goals and policy outlook; sharing ideas and infor-
mation/expertise becomes a means of cementing this 
linkage to supporting coalitions (Waterman, Rouse, & 
Wright, 2004, pp. 37-42). 
Carpenter offers a historical institutionalist analysis 
of bureaucratic autonomy that reinforces Hawkins and 
Jacoby’s strategies, particularly reinterpretation/innovation 
and building linkages/coalitions with third party actors. 
Bureaucratic autonomy involves agencies undertaking 
“sustained patterns of action” over time that accord 
with their own policy preferences. Carpenter suggests 
that bureaucracies need stable legitimacy in order to 
operate autonomously. Agencies attain this condition 
by developing a reputation and expertise in policy in-
novation (that becomes recognised by principals and 
wider society) and by establishing societal links more 
widely (Carpenter, 2001, pp. 14-18). Genuine policy au-
tonomy exists when agencies can make the decisive 
first moves towards a new policy, establishing the most 
popular alternative (the policy innovation), which be-
come too costly for politicians and organised interests 
to ignore or dismiss.  
Agencies operating with policy autonomy may exert 
a process of bureaucratic entrepreneurship (Carpenter, 
2001, pp. 30-31): the agency leadership, harnessing the 
agency’s expertise, introduces innovations to existing 
programmes and/or new programmes while gradually 
convincing the diverse political actors and coalitions to 
value the new innovation and the agencies themselves 
(both are essential acts of policy entrepreneurship). 
Agency actors sustain this preference shift by using 
recognised policy legitimacy, by building superior ties 
to the public and/or media, or by establishing reputa-
tions for impartiality or the pursuit of public good. For 
example, if agencies can build in advance compromises 
on policy elements with the various important stake-
holders affected by the policy, then they can reduce 
the incentives of these societal stakeholders to raise 
objections and galvanise principals (Lee, 2012). 
Waterman, Rouse and Wright (2004, pp. 37-42) 
conclude that information, learning and coalition build-
ing are core dynamics that transform the bureaucracy-
principal relationship: both sets of actors are learning 
over time about policy, politics and their own organisa-
tions. Bennett and Howlett (1992, pp. 278-288) suggest 
several relevant distinctions for different types of 
learning. “Government learning” focuses on under-
standing the administrative processes with the aim of 
organisational change; this maps onto agencies learn-
ing how to divide or persuade principals by building co-
alitions with certain principals and other societal ac-
tors. “Lesson drawing” focuses on how programmes 
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change via actors learning about new instruments and 
tools; such learning enables agencies to reinterpret 
their roles in a way that principals eventually learn to 
accept. “Social learning” encompasses the learning 
process where new world views are adopted, leading 
to radical policy paradigms shifts. This encompassed 
the rarer possibility that an agency will gain an under-
standing of public policy that transforms the policy role 
itself (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). 
Table 1 summarises the propositions offered in this 
section. Evidence for the first proposition suggests that 
normal PA delegation operates. Propositions Two to 
Five suggest conditions that can be encompassed with-
in the PA approach. Proposition Three allows for a 
range of possibilities, including: the principal cannot 
generate a consensus within its constituent elements; 
multiple principals cannot agree a course of action; and 
the principals’ outlook and priorities alters over time, 
due to changes in the executive and legislature. Propo-
sition Five expresses the possibility that the principal 
and any supporting actors may focus more, for exam-
ple, on the agency actions during the policy formula-
tion and decision-making but less so in the implemen-
tation and monitoring phases. Proposition Six includes 
exogenous forces such as economic crises and envi-
ronmental disasters that raise certain aspects that 
agencies wish to prioritise beyond what is established 
in the initial PA delegation. 
Propositions Seven to Nine articulate the three 
strategies agencies can utilise to transform the nature 
of the PA relationship. It is possible that such strategies 
would be more likely to succeed if they are interacting 
together. Agencies actively push innovation and seek a 
wider actor coalition to embrace this knowledge and 
embed it into their own routines and behavioural 
norms. All three forms of learning may occur in this sit-
uation, but agency learning about the policy problem 
and its engagement with both the principals and the 
wider policy context  is more likely to involve limited 
lesson drawing (e.g., incrementally improved under-
standings of the policy problem and new perspectives 
on instruments) and government learning that does 
not modify radically the organisational strategy and 
worldview.  
My overarching hypothesis is that we should see 
similar strategies being adopted by the three agencies 
to enhance their policy autonomy in a complex multi-
level context and that the agencies will be attracted to 
transformational strategies that reduce the potential 
for conflict with the principals. It is expected that more 
than one of the conditions in Table 1 may have to be in 
operation for the agency to gain this autonomy in a sit-
uation that does not result in a strong principal reac-
tion. If the agency’s operations in general, and in cli-
mate change specifically, are limited to the autonomy 
as outlined by the principal, the PA proposition holds. 
Table 1: Propositions. 
List of propositions  Expectations concerning the 
agency’s policy autonomy  
Null hypothesis  
(1) The default PA 
proposition  
Policy autonomy is stable, 
reflecting normal PA 
delegation. 
Propositions where 
PA dynamics remain 
but are made more 
complicated  
 
(2) Shirking Policy autonomy increases 
for agency acting against 
principal’s intentions. 
(3) Slippage Policy autonomy increases 
as agency exploits changes 
in the delegation or the lack 
of principal consensus due 
to: 
(a) composite principals; 
(b) multiple principals; 
(c) external changes in the 
principals. 
(4) Policy saliency Policy autonomy increases 
to the degree that the policy 
issue garners less political 
attention. 
(5) Policy stage Policy autonomy increases at 
the policy stage that draws 
less attention from 
principals and stakeholders. 
(6) Exogenous 
dynamics 
Policy autonomy increases 






(7) Dualism Policy autonomy increases 
due to agency deception and 
loose coupling of tasks. 
(8) Reinterpretation 
and learning 
Policy autonomy increases 
as agency engages in 
reinterpreting its mandate 
or transforming the 
understanding of its role. 
(9) Coalition-building Policy autonomy increases 
as agency learns to persuade 
principals and others to be 
sympathetic to agency’s 
position. 
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3. Comparative Analysis 
Taking each agency in turn, this section first focuses on 
changes in the agency’s policy autonomy, and provides 
an overview of the changes in the balance between the 
agency and the principals. Then each agency study drills 
down to investigate how agency policy autonomy has 
manifested itself in the CC case. Following the focused 
comparison approach, the USEPA is examined, followed 
by the EEA, with the illustration of a member state agen-
cy, the EA. Table 2 introduces some of the key agency dif-
ferences (in terms of the range of principals, the scope of 
the tasks and the range of steering mechanisms that 
principals possess) that each agency overview discusses. 
3.1. The USEPA  
3.1.1. The Evolving PA Relationship 
The 1970 order creating the USEPA enshrined a very 
important distinction from the other two agencies: the 
Presidential administration’s selection of political ap-
pointees to head both the agency and its key offices. 
This is a clear PA control mechanism; these appointees 
are agents with a more direct link and association to 
the principal. However, the impact and control of these 
officials varied widely depending on the individual. 
Some of the more effective USEPA Administrators, par-
ticularly Ruckleshaus, developed their own independ-
ent political base and prestige in office, but the political 
appointees mostly bring whatever political leverage ac-
cumulated in their past political/policy lives—e.g., 
prominent state governors (Interviews, USEPA officials, 
2007–2008).  
Also present from the start was a separate princi-
pal: the US Congress. This body, particularly when its 
houses are controlled by the US party opposing the 
President, can exert quite different pressures on the 
USEPA. Not only must the US Senate approve the EPA 
appointees, the US Congress must create the environ-
mental protection legislation, which the EPA imple-
ments, and decide the budgetary amount for the fed-
eral government, including the EPA and its programmes 
(Lazarus, 2004). Congress can also use appropriations 
bills to forbid agencies from spending the money to 
perform particular policy acts (MacDonald, 2013). Alt-
hough Congressional Committees have the ability to 
investigate through hearings and other mechanisms, 
the general preference is to rely on interest groups and 
citizens to raise problems (Carrigan & Coglianese, 
2011). After the USEPA’s initial founding, the Demo-
crat-controlled US Congress spent the 1970s distrusting 
the Republican White House administration and its 
agents, producing a wide range of statutes imposing 
stringent deadlines and limiting the EPA’s discretion. 
Congress also inserted various judicial review provi-
sions that allowed, and indeed encouraged, both the 
regulated and public interest organisations such as the 
environmental non-governmental organisations (EN-
GOs) to pursue litigation (Lazarus, 2004, pp. 79-81). 
Table 2: Agency characteristics. 
Agency Name USEPA EEA EA 
Key Principals Presidential Administration 
and Executive; US Congress.  
EU Commission, with 
budget within DG 
Environment; European 
Parliament (EP); EU Council 
of Ministers; member 
states.  
The UK executive with 
respect to England and 
Wales, with specific 
Ministerial oversight in 
DEFRA and DECC; House of 
Commons and Welsh 
Assembly; EU Commission. 
Key Tasks Implements US law by writing 
regulations and national 
standards; enforcing 
regulations; dispersal of US 
budget to states and other 
actors. 
Gathering information to 
support policy 
implementation; 
coordinating member state 
networks.  
Implement national and EU 
legislation, via issue of 
permits; acting as the 
competent authority 
responsible for implementing 
legislation. 
Critical mechanisms 
to limit agency policy 
autonomy after the 
delegation 
Political appointees leading 
key EPA segments; formulating 
rules under executive scrutiny 
and processes; Congressional 
approval of appointees, 
oversight and budget approval; 
consultation and engagement 
by societal stakeholders (may 
involve litigation). 
Appointment of the chair 
by the Management Board; 
the Management Board 
interactions; special 
reviews of activities; 
reporting especially to the 
Commission and other EU 
institutions.  
Agency reviews; government 
budgets; restructuring; 
reporting to UK and EU 
governing processes; 
engagement with societal 
actors who provide 
information to both the UK 
and EU governance 
structures. 
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One of the key alterations in the PA dynamics oc-
curred with the Reagan Administration’s arrival. The 
administration sought to subordinate the agency to a 
number of administrative measures; it created a num-
ber of Cabinet Councils to consider policy questions, 
marginalising the USEPA (Landy, Roberts, & Thomas, 
1994, pp. 248-250). The Reagan Administration also 
utilised an existing, centralising institution: the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB). The White House 
issued an executive order requiring all proposed major 
rulemaking to be submitted to the OMB for review and 
enabling the OMB to examine all extant rules (Interviews, 
USEPA officials, 2007–2011; Carrigan & Coglianese, 2011). 
The third control mechanism involved budgetary limits: 
the USEPA had to implement numerous 1970s laws, 
but the White House, waging a substantial battle with 
the Democrat-controlled Congress, substantially con-
tracted the EPA budget between 1980 and 1983 (Landy 
et al., 1994, pp. 248-250).  
Subsequent presidential administrations used these 
mechanisms—although for varying objectives. For ex-
ample, the Bush II Administration budget cuts (without 
directly challenging national law and the environmental 
coalitions) compelled the USEPA to re-prioritise what they 
saw as vital activities and abandon less essential items 
(Interviews, USEPA officials, 2007–2008).  
3.1.2. Climate Policy 
The USEPA CC policy starts with the 1989-1990 publica-
tion of two substantial climate documents arguing for 
stringent policy efforts (Landy et al., 1994, pp. 291-
295). The Bush Sr. Administration was unwilling to fol-
low through with a substantial mitigation agenda, ei-
ther at the national or international level; the Clinton 
era saw a more favourable CC approach. Given space 
constraints, this case study focuses on the Bush II and 
Obama Presidencies where diverging preferences be-
tween principals (the Executive and Congress) and the 
USEPA can be strongly documented.  
For most of the Bush II Presidency, the USEPA’s CC 
focus was relatively limited. In 2002, President Bush an-
nounced the plan to reduce greenhouse gas intensity by 
18% over a decade (USEPA Interviews, 23–24/11/2009). 
The USEPA was encouraged to pursue some lesson 
drawing about CC instruments; this exploration centred 
on developing voluntary climate efforts, and exploring 
technological solutions in areas such as transport (Inter-
views, USEPA official, 9/11/2012, USEPA officials, 23–
24/11/2009). Accordingly, the USEPA joined the De-
partment of Energy to implement the ENERGY STAR 
programme promoting energy-efficient products and 
processes (Interview former USEPA official, 19/11/13).  
The PA constraint was reflected most significantly 
in the actions and outlook of the Headquarters Unit, 
based so near the White House. There was a clear 
recognition that a more interventionist USEPA program 
was not possible given the Bush Presidency’s orienta-
tion. Numerous interviews suggest that a PA dynamic 
was at work where the preferences of the principal and 
agent differed: many lower level managers in the EPA 
Headquarters were simply “waiting” for a change of 
administration (Interviews, USEPA officials, 2007–2008, 
2013). This early half of the Bush II era suggests that 
both the limited EPA efforts and the actual policy in-
strument innovation aligned with the general White 
House preferences (fitting with Proposition One). 
However, this does not indicate all of the significant 
USEPA CC involvement. The lower (regional) USEPA 
layers have been involved with a number of state initi-
atives as well as carrying out their own limited activi-
ties. Here the states, as important policy stakeholders 
that receive USEPA rules and money, have provided 
strong governance leadership. This dynamic changed 
further as the state actors collided with the Bush Ad-
ministration. In 2003, nine New England and Mid-
Atlantic governors started negotiating a regional trad-
able permit scheme for emissions for power plants. 
This led to the 2005 memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) creating the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI, 2009). Although a number of them had Republi-
can governors, the state governments decided to tack-
le this issue in the perceived absence of Presidential 
leadership. This effort developed a transnational di-
mension as the same governors held discussions, again 
supported by the regional EPA officials, with the Cana-
dian provincial premiers prioritising climate change. 
This left the USEPA Region 1 (covering the New Eng-
land States) and Region 3 (Mid-Atlantic States) Head-
quarters with a balancing act. The USEPA reality is that 
the more regional agency elements must work closely 
with the state governments and environmental protec-
tion agencies to ensure implementation of the national 
laws and regulatory targets as well as adhere to the 
federal principals’ preferences (Interviews, state repre-
sentatives, 2012). In this context, the Region 1 leader-
ship consulted closely with the governors, giving policy 
advice. This effort maintained low visibility, without in-
volving a specific budget; resources within the offices 
were shifted from the traditional handling of issues to 
this CC question. This Regional EPA effort constitutes 
coalition building (Proposition Nine) around the cli-
mate change objective, but with the states taking the 
active policy leadership. These two Regional offices 
were able to carve out their own small niches to tackle 
climate change even during the Bush II era. As the Bush 
II Administration had to be careful about issues of 
state’s rights, particularly for states with Republican 
leadership this suggests some slippage for the principal 
(Proposition Three), which gave the USEPA more room 
to act in conjunction with these states.  
Further policy autonomy is seen in each Region’s 
implementation of the Safe Water Drinking Act (SWDA) 
(Interviews, USEPA officials, 2008). To implement this 
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legislation, the top managers of Region 1 actively in-
corporated CC issues, using the rationale that the po-
tential CC impact on water systems raised questions for 
the drinking water objectives. This thinking chimed 
with the national media office, the Office of Water. As 
the SWDA did not have CC as a primary policy focus, 
the Regional officers engaged in some reinterpretation 
of laws they were required to implement. Therefore 
Regional Office 1 shifted some resources to address 
this CC problem. The office turned the available tools 
dealing with the water issue to the linked CC area, such 
as the monitoring of the waste water industry’s energy 
efficiency. A similar shifting of effort and purpose oc-
curred in energy conservation efforts. These findings 
suggest that both slippage and dualism occurred, as 
certain Water objectives set by Congress gave the EPA 
greater scope to work on CC contrary to the wishes of 
the Executive. It also helped the Regional office that 
they were seeking to implement a piece of US legisla-
tion (Proposition 5), but reinterpretation was also in-
volved. This supports Opp’s (2011) findings that USEPA 
regions can possess a varying degree of discretion; this 
in turn influences how states and localities implement 
national legislation. 
It is important not to overstate the impact of this 
USEPA policy autonomy. Much of the USEPA effort was 
done under the policy radar screen at the national level 
and at the margins. For the USEPA, the greater policy 
changes happened elsewhere. Congress developed 
several bills to directly tackle CC and distance itself 
from the White House. Of more immediate importance 
to the USEPA was the 2007 US Supreme Court ruling 
against the USEPA. Here a number of petitioners, joined 
by the state of Massachusetts, sought to see greenhouse 
gas emissions as pollutants that can be regulated under 
the extant US law (the Clean Air Act—CAA); the Court 
decided for the petitioners (Massachusetts et al. v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency et al., 2007). The USEPA 
responded to this Supreme Court decision by empower-
ing its Office of Air and Radiation to develop rules to 
tackle greenhouse gasses through the CAA (USEPA, 
2008; Interview, USEPA official, 2007). The Court ruling 
and the use of current regulations suggest the slippage 
dynamic; here a key PA monitoring device, legal action, 
forced a readjustment by the executive and the EPA, ra-
ther than an USEPA-led reinterpretation.  
It is telling that the Bush Administration and the 
EPA Administrator Johnson managed to tone down the 
critical finding about CC endangerment in the EPA draft 
response to the ruling, (McGarity, 2013). In these cir-
cumstances, the EPA continued to develop several 
rules (including one that the OMB refused to upload 
and thus finalise the review process) and research to 
support the policy efforts (Heinzerling, 2012). The amount 
of effort the EPA staff spent on this suggests shirking, with 
the anticipation of future principal slippage. 
With the arrival of the Obama administration and 
new political appointees, notable changes can be seen. 
In response to the 2007 Supreme Court Decision, the 
USEPA Administrator Jackson signed an action that the 
current and projected concentrations of the six key 
greenhouse gases be considered a threat to the “public 
health and welfare of current and future generations” 
(USEPA, 2009). This action acknowledged the CC threat, 
triggering mandatory action under the CAA. Obama 
signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 
2009; it provided the USEPA, among other things, with 
$6 billion to tackle energy efficiency and the ability of 
water systems to cope with CC (Recovery.gov, 2009).  
In the wake of significant bipartisan opposition in 
Congress and the healthcare battle, the Obama Admin-
istration prioritised using the 2007 Court ruling to ex-
ploit extant regulations, particularly the CAA (Cappiel-
lo, 2009). Accordingly, the EPA proposed a Carbon 
Pollution Standard for New Power Plants that defines 
national limits on the carbon emissions for the first 
time (USEPA, 2012). The Rule continues to be devel-
oped in 2015; there are indications that it will incorpo-
rate the state-led tradable permit scheme to achieve 
its goals (Volcovici, 2014).  
However, by 2012 the political tide had turned in the 
US Congress with a resurgence of the Republican right 
taking the US House of Representatives, symbolised by 
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
form requiring the EPA Administrator Jackson to testify 
seven times in one month (McGarity, 2013). Although 
the USEPA pursues standards on cars and power plants 
(including work started during the Bush Administration), 
the EPA has delayed other tools given this principal and 
societal opposition (Heinzerling, 2012). The EPA Climate 
Change Division has sought to mitigate this opposition 
by pursuing the participation and views of various stake-
holders while developing the Mandatory Reporting of 
Greenhouse Gases Rule. Cook and Rinfret (2013) find 
that this EPA (coalition-building) strategy is one the 
Agency is pursuing in other rule-making efforts. 
The analysis above suggests that the EPA has not 
gained much policy autonomy concerning CC; much 
more significant has been the change in the principals’ 
thinking, particularly the White House, and the clients, 
including state governments. The USEPA is more nota-
ble for its ability to maintain its expertise and general 
approach to the policy problem while waiting for the 
principal to change: the preferences of the executive 
under Obama and the agency converged more strongly 
(Interview, USEPA official, November 2013).  
3.2. The EEA  
3.2.1. The Evolving PA Relationship 
The EU Regulation 1210/90 creating the EEA estab-
lished both the PA dynamics and the opportunities to 
form broader relationships. The Regulation also con-
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tained notable ambiguities—particularly the EEA’s rela-
tionship to the Commission and its role in formulating 
EU policy (Majone, 1997). The composition of the over-
seeing EEA Management Board included a range of 
principals (see Table 2), namely the EP, Commission 
and state representatives, who had haggled over the 
Agency’s original role (Groenleer, 2009; Zito, 2009).  
The compromise Regulation placed the EEA in a 
role of information and network co-ordination (Ladeur, 
1996); it explicitly mandated the network system to 
utilise extant European structures and hence engage 
with national institutions (Commission, 1989). The 
EIONET network contained nine specialist European 
Topic Centres (ETC) and the National Focal Points—
national institutions tasked with assisting the EEA work 
programme and the EIONET (EEA, n.d.). Regulation Ar-
ticle 14 specifically mandates EEA co-operation with 
other international organisations, giving the network-
ing global scope (Council, 1990). 
The EEA has harnessed its network agency mandate 
to engage both internal and external actors linked to 
the EU policy-making process. The EIONET system re-
quires substantial networking with a range of state of-
ficials and civil society. The original Regulation offers 
possibilities for interpretation/re-interpretation to al-
low the EEA officials to expand its tasks, which involved 
certain policy implications (Interviews, two EEA offi-
cials, 2007; Groenleer, 2009). The Regulation’s ambig-
uous language strongly suggests the importance of 
slippage, which was driven by a compromise between 
the key principals with differing priorities. Accordingly, 
the EEA officials used the Regulatory obligation to in-
teract with non-EU countries and international bodies 
to showcase EEA expertise, experience and knowledge 
about networking and data collection (Interviews, two 
EEA officials, 2007). 
Shifting to another PA dynamic, the original Regula-
tion required that the Commission review the Agency’s 
performance and make proposals concerning addition-
al tasks to the Council (Council, 1999, p. 1). Several 
principals (e.g., the EP) viewed this provision as a 
mechanism for expanding EEA power (slippage). Simul-
taneously, the review could serve as the traditional PA 
monitoring tool to assess performance, potentially 
triggering constraints and sanctions. The review, start-
ed in 1997, could have produced widely varying results, 
depending on the principals’ perceptions and actions. 
The consequent revised Regulation 933/1999 of-
fered nothing dramatic but included significant chang-
es of nuance, allowing slippage. The Revised Article 2 
reformulates the aims “to provide the Community and 
the Member States with the objective information 
necessary for framing and implementing sound and ef-
fective environmental policies” (Council, 1999, p. 2). 
This changed the interpretation of the EEA’s role as 
moving from mere data collection to one involving an 
explicit policy function and expertise.  
This revised Regulation pushed the Agency to en-
gage in some governmental learning, via reforming its 
information systems and gaining a new focus on sec-
toral integration and prospective analysis (IEEP [Insti-
tute for European Environmental Policy] & EIPA [Euro-
pean Institute for Public Administration], 2003, p. 26). 
The revised Regulation enshrined a PA monitoring pro-
cess, requiring a further review of the agency’s per-
formance by the principals (Council, 1999, p. 2).  
This second major review assessed positively the 
1994−2000 EEA performance, affirming the need for 
the Agency and EIONET (IEEP & EIPA, 2003, pp. 26-27). 
It argued that the Agency’s work needed to fit more 
closely with the clients’ (principal’s) needs, but that it 
could not serve all users, nor all policy areas, given ex-
tremely limited resources. The review argued that the 
EEA’s role needed to shift from providing stand alone 
products (such as reports) to providing services to the 
policy-making actors. This recommendation provided 
scope for agency task expansion in the area of policy 
(Ibid). The Review also triggered an explicit Council 
statement enshrining the EEA’s independent role as 
serving the entire EU, granting some policy autonomy 
in conditions of slippage (Interview, Management 
Board, 2007; Council, 2003). 
Another active PA mechanism is the EEA Manage-
ment Board (MB). The MB must approve the EEA work 
programme and various organisational/staffing deci-
sions; it acts as conduit of information and networking 
between the EEA and its principals. The PA dynamic 
has gradually evolved from 1990: e.g., the MB prefer-
ences becoming more diffuse after EU enlargement, al-
lowing more opportunities for slippage. 
The critical relationship with Commission DG for 
Environment (the DG has special control and is the lo-
cation of the EEA budget) has significantly changed 
from 2000 and has added some dimensions of policy 
autonomy, compared to previous academic assess-
ments (e.g., Hoornbeek, 2000). Before that, some 
Commission officials held that the EEA takes the DG’s 
money and accordingly obligated to do its bidding (EEA 
actor interview, 2007; IEEP & EIPA, 2003, pp. 62-63). 
The policy role has been core in the EEA evolution 
away from merely writing informational reports and 
maintaining databases. This Agency policy activity gen-
erated tension with DG Environment’s view of the 
Commission as the chief agent governing environmen-
tal policy and also the EEA’s chief client; the 1998 and 
2000 budget demonstrated the DG resistance and de-
sire to downgrade lower EEA priority tasks (IEEP & EI-
PA, 2003, pp. 38-40, 61-62). Nevertheless, the EEA 
leadership grasped that the provision of environmental 
information is inherently ambiguous and not policy 
neutral: data gathering involves assessing how policy 
problems are perceived and how policies function (In-
terviews, 2 EEA officials 2007). This development sug-
gests both policy slippage and reinterpretation/ 
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governmental learning concerning the EEA’s potential. 
Although differences in opinion remain about the 
EEA role in policy implementation and effectiveness, 
the Commission and the EEA have developed a more 
collaborative relationship (IEEP & EIPA, 2003, pp. 42-
43; Groenleer, 2009). The EEA fashioned a more sensi-
tive approach to the DG and senior and middle man-
agement interactions (Interviews, 2 EEA officials, one 
MB official, 2007; IEEP & EIPA, 2003, pp. 60-62). The 
Commission has accepted the policy reinterpretation, 
explicitly acknowledging the importance of EEA’s role 
and a potential extension of EEA support activities 
“along the entire range of stages of the policy cycle” 
(Commission, 2003, p. 10; Interview, MB official, 2007). 
The role of competing principals and slippage has 
shaped this evolution as the EEA created deeper ties 
(Proposition Nine) to the EP, the Council and like-
minded member states (Busuioc & Groenleer, 2012, p. 
140; IEEP and EIPA, 2003, p. 42). The EEA has sought to 
be responsive to state wishes through the develop-
ment of conferences and background notes (i.e., back-
ground policy expertise). Changes in EU policy process-
es and demands have boosted this expanding EEA 
policy role (IEEP & EIPA, 2003, pp. 28-29). The Cardiff 
process and the Sixth Action Programme generated 
particular policy requests (by the principals) for specific 
Agency information.  
The EP Environment Committee boosted the EEA 
scope. The Committee requested ad hoc reports and 
background material on Commission legislative pro-
posals and on related member state activity. This data 
requirement, focusing on general policy aspects, dif-
fered from the more detailed information that the 
Commission wanted the EEA to prioritise (Groenleer, 
2009, p. 234). This request was partly a conscious EP 
effort to boost the EEA’s scope to conduct a level of 
discrete, limited policy analysis and provide policy ex-
pertise; a MOU between the EEA and EP concretised 
this effort (Interview, MB official, 2007). Two initial pol-
icy contributions (assessing the effectiveness of pack-
aging waste implementation and of the urban waste 
water treatment directives) concretised this effort 
(IEEP & EIPA, 2003, p. 32; Interview, consultant, 2007). 
The consequent relatively stable principal-agent link-
ages suggest the EEA’s ability, albeit in a limited fash-
ion, to reinterpret its role to include policy. This sup-
ports Trondal’s (2010, p. 164) assessment about the 
trajectory of EU agencies. 
3.2.2. Climate Policy 
The EEA’s role in CC policy indicates limitations in the 
policy autonomy that the EEA has gained. On this issue, 
the EEA has remained focused on activities set out by 
the principals. For example, the EEA has used its data 
expertise to assist the other institutions in developing 
the Greenhouse Gas Monitoring Mechanism. The main 
EEA emphasis has been to help monitor and assess the 
EU progress in achieving emissions targets (EEA, 2009, 
pp. 11, 19). The EEA issued a 2007 report, arguing for 
the need to adapt water resource policy and suggesting 
a range of tools to help (EEA, 2007). 
The EEA also provides analysis for planning a Euro-
pean low-carbon economy and support information for 
the latest international climate negotiations. The low-
carbon economy analyses include the study of inte-
grated mitigation and adaptation outlooks, as well as 
analysing future scenarios. Special attention is devoted 
to improving and maintaining information and indica-
tors of the climate change impacts, looking at current 
trends as well as hindcasting and forecasting Europe’s 
climate (EEA, 2009, p. 19). The EEA has the annual re-
sponsibility of reporting the inventory of EU climate 
change emissions to UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change process (EEA, 2015). The EEA’s CC ef-
forts reflect the standard PA dynamic: providing data 
and a limited amount of policy analysis at the behest of 
the Commission, member states and the EP. 
3.3. The EA  
3.3.1. The Evolving PA Relationship 
The 1996 creation of the EA involved a merger of vari-
ous organisations; this triggered a period (1996–1998) 
of considerable staff adjustment, low staff morale and 
a lack of management consensus about the agency’s 
tasks and processes (Interview, 3 EA officials, 2007; 
McMahon, 2006, pp. 156-157). An additional challenge 
was pleasing the array of principals (see Table 2); these 
included the UK government (with particular oversight 
from DEFRA but also DECC concerning CC responsibili-
ties), but also the House of Commons, the Welsh As-
sembly and the EU Treaty obligations monitored and 
enforced particularly by the Commission. 
Perhaps the most notable UK government interven-
tion and imposition of will from 2002 to 2014 has been 
the considerable and seemingly perpetual organisa-
tional restructuring and personnel changes, which part-
ly explains continuing staff tensions (Interviews, 3 EA 
officials, 2007; 22 June 2010). A major 2002–2007 re-
structuring occurred to ensure that the EA produced a 
consistent set of instructions and uniform policy deci-
sions at the sub-national level (Interview, EA official, 14 
March 2007; House of Commons Environment Com-
mittee, 2006, pp. 16-17).  
The 2010 UK Coalition Government forced further 
significant organisational changes, and has been con-
ducting reviews with potentially drastic consequences 
for the EA, not least a review assessing the value of UK’s 
EU membership. At the sector level, the government 
eliminated 53 of 85 of DEFRA advisory bodies (e.g., the 
Expert Panel on Air Quality Standards) in the “bonfire of 
the quangoes” (Interview, DEFRA official, 11 October 
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2011; ENDS Report, 2010). Although the EA survived the 
initial purge, the Government ordered a triennial review 
of UK ministries, and all associated “arm’s length” agen-
cies to examine the need for agencies to exist outside 
the ministries and/or as independent entities (DEFRA, 
2012b). In June 2013 the review concluded that the EA 
should remain a separate body but also continue to en-
hance service delivery and efficiencies (DEFRA, 2013).  
As of 2014, budget cuts have forced the largest or-
ganisational changes. The Coalition Government has 
particularly cut DEFRA (the ministry providing the ma-
jor budget for the EA). By December 2012, the Agency 
had lost 20% of its budget and 2000 member of staff. 
The Government forced cuts in a key climate change-
related issue area, flooding, but the 2012 floods forced 
a partial reversal (Carrington, 2012; Interview, EA Offi-
cial, 2010). In 2014, during the winter floods crisis, the 
EA announced that the objective to cut the work force 
from 11250 to 9700 was still planned after a consulta-
tion period (BBC News, 2014). 
Besides changing the budgetary cuts and reviews, 
the Coalition government gave a very clear steer that 
the EA should not challenge Government policy and 
should have a more internal organisational focus. From 
1996 to this point, the EA, although enforcement re-
mained its primary role, had increasingly viewed its 
general UK policy role as being an environment cham-
pion and had worked to shape policy (Interviews, 6 EA 
staff, 2007, 2008, 2010). DEFRA specifically told the EA 
to “stop policymaking and lobbying activities” (ENDS 
Report, October 2010). The EA leadership responded 
explicitly, dropping policy stances and altering job titles 
(Interview, EA Official, 2010).  
One of the efforts to adjust the EA relationship with 
the UK and EU principals has involved learning (balanced 
more towards lesson drawing than social learning) about 
policy. The Agency had decided to make an effort to 
modernise environmental regulation, even before the 
1997 New Labour government made it a priority (Inter-
view, EA official, 1 December 2010). This reflects EA 
recognition that regulatory management must maximise 
efficiency, given ongoing resource constraints (DEFRA, 
2003, pp. 12-16; House of Commons Environment 
Committee, 2006, pp. 13-15). The 2010 Coalition Gov-
ernment pushed DEFRA and the EA to streamline envi-
ronmental regulation further (DEFRA, 2012a). This cul-
minated in the development of new civil sanctions 
powers sourced in the 2008 Regulatory Enforcement 
and Sanctions Act. Interviews suggest that both high 
level and mid-level EA officials took particular interest in 
the USEPA’s wide range of potential sanctioning tools 
(e.g., fines and voluntary agreements to undertake re-
medial action to supplement regulation) (Interviews, EA, 
USEPA officials, 2007–2008). This EA reinterpretation 
and learning about policy tools does not constitute shirk-
ing or transformation as it matches the preferences of 
the UK governments in the last two decades.  
The EA leadership has endeavoured to enhance its 
impact, through such innovations, at both the interna-
tional and EU levels. The EA became a prime mover of 
the Networks of the Heads of Environmental Protec-
tion Agencies (Interview EEA actor, 2007). The EA has 
been also active in the Implementation and Enforce-
ment of Environmental Law (IMPEL) and EEA networks, 
pushing ideas such as the better regulation agenda (In-
terview, EA officials, 2007).  
Because the EA is a competent authority for im-
plementing EU regulations, the UK ministries had to in-
clude the EA in discussing new EU measures. Over 
time, the EU Commission has learned to respect the 
EA’s input in its own right (Interviews, Consultant & EA 
officials, 2007).The Agency utilises an evidence-based 
approach to its argumentation that the Commission 
finds useful (Interview, EA officials, 2007). Important 
EU policy examples include: the general structure and 
provisions of the Water Framework Directive and the 
use of risk-based calculations in the Contaminated 
Land Directive (Interview, EA official, 2007).  
Nevertheless, DEFRA, as a core principal that is the 
voice of the UK ministerial government in the EU pro-
cess, carefully limits EA engagement with the Commis-
sion (Interview, EA official, 2007; House of Commons 
Environment Committee, 2006, p. 29). Thus at best on-
ly mild slippage (Proposition three) occurs. EA people 
only support EU Council negotiations and must adhere 
to the Ministerial/principal line (Interview, EA officials, 
2007). The EA avoids letting its networking efforts 
compete with DEFRA’s. The overall picture is the UK 
government maintaining a close rein on the EA’s policy 
autonomy in both the domestic and EU context, in line 
with PA expectations. 
3.3.2. Climate Change Policy 
There has been some national debate about whether 
the EA had responsibility for UK climate change policy 
beyond flood control. The lack of a remit in the energy 
and transport sectors has always constrained EA CC 
scope. In the UK implementation of the EU’s United Na-
tions Framework obligations, the EA is responsible for 
implementing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
and acts as a regulator for the sectoral climate change 
agreements and the voluntary Energy Efficiency Scheme.  
Although not a leader in designing the ETS, the EA 
role as a regulatory and advisory body allowed it to in-
fluence UK government decisions, including a UK trad-
ing scheme that anticipated the EU’s. The EA serves as 
the principal government advisor on such matters as 
climate capture and storage and as the regulator of key 
climate change emissions, including non-carbon diox-
ide emissions from plant installations and landfill sites 
(Interviews, EA officials, 2010).  
There is less scope for the EA to model climate 
change given the presence of other UK institutes. The EA 
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does have the scope to assess how the changing climate 
will evolve. A key EA strength has been its advanced in-
tegrated catchment strategy, providing rainfall and tem-
perature data. The EA focus is less to deal with mitiga-
tion issues than with the monitoring and adaptation 
roles; the mitigation policy fights occur at the EU and UK 
ministerial levels. Both these implementation and 
knowledge-building tasks fit within the normal bounds 
of the PA relationship as the agency activities mesh with 
the preferences of the national and EU principals. 
It is arguable that some policy slippage and reinter-
pretation has occurred in the question of CC policy adap-
tion and the overarching contraction of the national 
budget. The EA adaptation role is fundamental: a cen-
tral, and relatively protected, part of the EA budget is 
flood control. The New Labour Government pondered 
whether a standalone flood agency was more suitable 
for handling the future flooding challenge, but its review 
discarded this idea (Interview, two EA officials, 2007). 
The EA was particularly influential in pushing for CC adap-
tation into the UK Climate Change Bill agreed in 2007. 
Originally the proposal had focused on mitigation. Here 
both the EA, as well as DEFRA, worked to change the gov-
ernment legislation and policy preferences through rein-
terpretation and arguably social learning (Keskitalo, 2010).  
However, the winter 2013–2014 floods placed the 
Agency’s flood expertise and strategy in a political fire-
storm as many political (and government) actors 
blamed the EA for the Somerset flooding, rather than, 
for instance, the strategic government choices about 
how to spend a finite flood defence budget (Smith, 
2014). This questioning of the EA’s effectiveness has 
coincided with a wholesale workforce reduction (BBC 
News, 2014). The UK government and the EA have re-
futed claims that these cuts affect front-line flood pre-
vention with climate change policy prioritised, but the 
reality is that the cuts have significantly reduced the 
EA’s policy and science wings, many of which produce 
activities linked to climate mitigation and adaptation 
policy (Interview, EA official, 2007). This limits some of 
the wider UK and EU CC policy objectives.  
The EA continues to promote its CC expertise at the 
EU level: for example, the EA convinced the Commis-
sion to accept the UK approach to flood risk manage-
ment. The EA representatives managed to explain what 
the UK was doing and persuade the Commission to re-
interpret its flood risk proposal to allow the EA to keep 
its system in place (Interview, EA officials, 2007, 2010). 
This section suggests that, as the budget crisis has be-
come the UK government’s focus, there has been some 
slippage between this prioritisation and some of the 
longer-term goals set for UK CC policy at the national 
and EU levels, but no greater policy autonomy as a result. 
4. Conclusions 
This conclusion examines first how the propositions of 
Table 1 stand up to the evidence. Table 3 lays out the 
evidence uncovered in the case studies for each propo-
sition. We then examine the wider analytical implica-
tions and pose questions for future research. 
4.1. Agency Findings 
Focusing first upon the strategic efforts to build policy 
autonomy, the general evolution of the EEA stands out 
as demonstrating the clearest sustained strategic ef-
fort, although this has not extended to the area of CC 
directly. Arguably the wider policy implications for this 
information-orientated agency are much smaller than 
the other two agencies with tremendous regulatory re-
sponsibilities and resources. Nevertheless, we see the 
EEA officials using the Regulation’s textual ambiguities, 
and the multiple principals’ differing preferences, to 
build a limited policy autonomy that did not exist origi-
nally in the preferences of at least one principal, the 
Commission. The Commission wished to protect its own 
policy powers and avoid duplicated effort. Of the three 
agencies, it is the EEA that has most successfully trans-
formed and “educated” the outlook of the principals. 
The EEA transformation of the principals’ prefer-
ences indicates that several PA dynamics were involved 
(see Table 3). It is significant that the agency, in terms of 
the policy cycle, was providing information across the 
cycle, rather than dominating and defining a particular 
policy stage. More important was the existence of the 
multiple principals and the slippage that they created. 
Slippage was necessary but not sufficient: the EEA offi-
cials had to be willing to push the possibility of expand-
ing the policy scope through a conscious strategy. They 
did so by learning (government learning and lesson 
drawing) to interpret/reinterpret their mandate, and by 
using their networks and other tasks to build strong rela-
tions with principals besides the Commission. This strat-
egy had a multi-level dimension as it involved engage-
ment with member state actors, such as the EA, but also 
other international organisations and non-EU countries. 
In contrast, the EU member state agency (EA) case, 
despite involving multiple principals, does not reveal 
much evidence of efforts to overturn the preferences 
of core principals in either the overview or the climate 
change case study. The EA had a moderate level of suc-
cess in using expertise to persuade the UK government 
and the Commission to rethink certain pieces of legisla-
tion. This reinterpretation was important in terms of 
the policy choices made, but did not carve out policy 
autonomy for the agency. This suggests the power of 
the UK executive with the ability of the majority-
backed government to radically alter the scope and 
shape of the agency in the face of the opinions of other 
principals. Other state agencies will need to be studied 
to generalise this conclusion. External events (the eco-
nomic crisis) and the UK government’s response have 
not extended but rather limited EA autonomy. 
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Table 3. Evidence of policy autonomy mapped against the propositions. 
List of propositions  USEPA EEA EA 
Null hypothesis    
(1) The default PA 
proposition  
In the climate change case 
study, most of the EPA policy 
outputs at HQ level conform 
to PA norms. 
In the climate change case, 
the EEA outputs were 
focused on reports and 
information in line with PA 
norms. 
In the climate change case, 
most of the EA policy outputs 
conform to PA norms. 
Propositions where PA 
dynamics remain but are 
made complicated  
   
(2) Shirking EPA regions shifted resources 
to CC under the SWDA. 
Certain offices within the EPA 
continued to develop CC 
policy plans while waiting for 
the end of the Bush II 
Administration. 
No evidence presented. No evidence presented. 
(3) Slippage The US Supreme Court ruling 
empowered the EPA to 
develop CC rules using the 
Clean Air Act against the Bush 
II White House wishes. 
The EEA’s general policy 
scope has been enhanced by 
the explicit effort of certain 
principals (e.g. EP, Council) 
and the reviews of the EEA 
activities. 
Marginal slippage might be 
possible given EU 
requirements but largely in 
line with Ministerial (PA) 
direction. 
(4) Policy saliency EPA regions in Northeast US 
re-interpreted the SWDA and 
work with state governors in 
low key fashion. 
No evidence presented. No evidence presented. 
(5) Policy stage SWDA actions at regional 
level focused on 
implementation. 
The focus on providing policy 
reports and providing 
information covers all stages. 
No sense of a policy stage 
creating autonomy; policy 
implementation of flood 
control provoked high 
visibility control. 
(6) Exogenous dynamics No evidence of this variable 
affecting PA relationships. 
No evidence of this variable 
affecting PA relationships. 
No evidence of this creating 
more policy autonomy; 
economic crisis has led to 
budget cuts reducing 
autonomy. 
Propositions that transform 
PA dynamics 
   
(7) Dualism EPA regions shifting 
resources to CC under the 
SWDA. 
No evidence provided. No evidence provided. 
(8) Reinterpretation and 
learning 
EPA regions shifting 
resources to CC under the 
SWDA. 
Substantial reinterpretation 
of role to move beyond mere 
information provision. 
EA helped push government 
reinterpretation of 2007 CC 
Bill. EA succeeded in 
persuading Commission to 
accept UK flood risk 
approach. 
(9) Coalition-building EPA regions built alliances 
with state governments on 
CC. Coalition building during 
effort to develop Mandatory 
Reporting of Greenhouse 
Gases Rule. 
Strong efforts made to reach 
out to the principals 
especially the EP and Council 
of Ministers, but also non-EU 
states, international 
organisations. 
No evidence provided. 
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This lack of effort to promote autonomy does not 
mean that the EA operated without a strategy for en-
gaging with the wider national and EU processes. It has 
had to learn and relearn its roles in the face of sus-
tained government restructuring; it worked to build 
expertise and innovation in particular areas (govern-
ment learning and lesson drawing). It received national 
and EU credit for expertise, building vital aspects that 
fed into the EU Water Framework Directive and re-
thinking of regulations. It has worked hard to engage 
other actors and to build a reputation for expertise. 
The agency does face issues of slippage (i.e., not meet-
ing preferences of principals on particular issues) as it 
seeks to fulfil its main tasks with a much reduced work 
force, but there seems to be no scope at present to 
boost policy autonomy in CC or other areas.  
The USEPA overview suggests that the Presidential 
executive and the US Congress have elaborated and 
developed control mechanisms, while also harnessing a 
range of interest groups and societal actors to monitor 
(and challenge) EPA decisions. The climate change his-
tory of the two most recent presidential administra-
tions largely supports the null hypothesis affirming PA 
theory (see Table 3). In the Bush White House, the EPA 
policy offices tended to have preferences quite contra-
ry to the White House leadership, but they had to bide 
their time with some low visibility shirking. There was 
policy and information development, but not outputs 
(as they would have been blocked). The Obama Admin-
istration has (cautiously) allowed the USEPA to pursue 
these preferences, but both face open hostility from 
elements of US society and Congress.  
However, focusing on the subnational level and 
even slightly at the transnational level, we see EPA Re-
gional officers exploiting relations to build alliances and 
to support (often Republican state government) initia-
tives that conflict with the White House preferences. 
The existence of other regulations requiring implemen-
tation allowed the Regional officers to reinterpret (gov-
ernment learning and lesson drawing) these require-
ments to include CC goals, creating a dualist scenario. 
4.2. Broader Themes 
Returning to the most different comparison, there 
does seem to be certain similar dynamics at work in 
the US and EU-level agency. Overall, the evidence for 
shirking, Proposition Two, is minimal for all three agen-
cies, compared to cases of preference transformation 
and the continued assertion of the PA constraints. This 
broadly supports the null hypothesis and alerts us to 
the continuing importance of the PA dynamic. 
Nevertheless, the multi-level governance and the 
multiple principals found in both systems indicate very 
strongly that there are important qualifications and 
conditions at work for the PA thesis. These conditions 
may not have dominated the three cases, but the epi-
sodes of policy autonomy were significant, particularly 
for the EEA, and do not conform to the PA null hypoth-
esis. The existence of the US Congress and European 
Parliament, as well as individual states with differing 
preferences, created conditions of slippage which both 
agencies exploited, and this involved some learning 
particularly for the EEA.  
In terms of the comparison, the EA contrasts sub-
stantially with the other two agencies. With the rela-
tively strong central control over the local areas in Eng-
land and Wales and the dominance of a majority-
backed government executive, the scope for the EA to 
boost its policy autonomy against a highly centralised 
UK government was comparatively minimal. 
The PA approach needs to delve more fully into the 
consequences of multiple actors and principals operat-
ing at different levels, creating political opportunities. 
Both the USEPA and the EEA were able to build allianc-
es with sympathetic constituents to enhance policy au-
tonomy. The possibilities of interactions beyond EU 
borders have also enhanced the EEA’s position; the 
USEPA has been able to stretch its expertise and influ-
ence into relations with Canada and the EA. In ac-
knowledging the importance of the PA dynamics, it 
remains important to embrace the critiques offered by 
the institutionalist and strategy arguments. Slippage 
did not simply result in policy autonomy. Both the 
USEPA and the EEA had to operate an active strategy of 
building coalitions of sympathetic allies (both principals 
and others) to underpin their efforts, including those 
efforts at reinterpretation. Indeed the cases suggest 
that (although this may not be necessary in cases of 
low visibility such as EPA regions implementing the 
SWDA) where there is potentially strong interest and 
resistance from one principal, it is vital to combine coa-
lition-building with the strategies of dualism and rein-
terpretation.  
At the same time, the institutionalist and strategy 
approaches, as articulated by Carpenter and Jacoby, 
need to pay closer attention to the PA dynamics. Trans-
formation of the preferences of principals was possi-
ble, but it took on wider significance for both the 
USEPA and EEA when other principals and interested 
actors were active in the areas. Slippage of some kind 
has provided a vital condition for agency strategies to 
pursue policy autonomy. This also reinforces the un-
derstanding that lesson drawing and policy learning re-
quire favourable conditions for the ideas they generate 
to have a meaningful policy impact outside the agen-
cy’s office. 
This suggests a broader conclusion about the PA 
approaches and conditions: the instances where policy 
autonomy occurred tended to involve both PA situa-
tional conditions (propositions 2–6) and particular 
agency strategies (propositions 7–9). Agency reinter-
pretation happened where other favourable conditions 
occurred, such as slippage and low visibility policy im-
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plementation as well as coalition building. 
Choosing a politically highly salient case such as 
climate change seems to have been significant, espe-
cially given the ability of regional EPA offices to make 
use of the SWDA. The pressure that the EA has found 
itself under concerning the recent floods, and the or-
ganised opposition across the US political spectrum, 
both reveal a policy environment where the larger na-
tional executive has been extremely watchful and in-
terventionist. The EEA’s move to greater policy auton-
omy did not occur in the climate change area. It is likely 
that other, less visible technical policy areas see great-
er scope for policy autonomy. 
The evidence presented in this contribution, partic-
ularly with respect to the climate change case, strongly 
suggests that political executives (such as the White 
House and the UK ministries) are able to exert a sub-
stantial political control over the agencies and envi-
ronmental policy administration. It takes a significant 
combination of multiple principals and interested par-
ties, and an agency strategy, to generate real policy au-
tonomy. Nevertheless, the importance of multiple ac-
tors and levels is notable in a number of transnational 
environmental policy areas, suggesting that there will 
be possibilities for strategic actors willing to push new 
understandings of policy (lesson drawing and policy 
learning) and build alliances (government learning). 
4.3. Future Research 
One interesting dynamic that needs further elaboration 
within the PA approach is the question of the impact of 
principals that also compete with the agent. The USEPA 
does not have a direct rival in governing environmental 
policy, but the case is very different for the two Euro-
pean agencies. Both DG Environment and DECC and 
DEFRA have been very reluctant concerning efforts of 
the respective agencies to expand policy autonomy. On 
one level, this has extended the control of the principal 
and limited policy autonomy; this supports the conclu-
sion of Trondal (2011) who argues that duplication can 
increase principal’s control. However, as Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl (2008) suggest, conditions of slippage may 
occur where other principals are willing to view the 
agency and the principal as rivals for policy advice; the 
EEA was able to exploit this to a degree. 
In terms of the agencies being able to govern the 
climate change issue and other wicked problems, I of-
fer three thoughts for further exploration. First, even 
compared to the USEPA, the EEA and EA have had rela-
tively short histories; in that time, both agencies faced 
a continuing process of being reviewed with the poten-
tial for massive organisational restructuring. The USEPA 
has a more established and larger organisational ap-
proach that could wait for a new administration whilst 
still undertaking climate change policies. Second, polit-
ical intervention seems to be inherent in such an issue 
as climate change, but this seems reasonable given the 
tremendous societal consequences of climate change; 
it cannot be left to technocracy. Finally, however, the 
necessity of dealing with such a complex issue suggests 
that an agency that can develop expertise on the prob-
lem and persuade the political masters to embrace this 
new understanding also is fundamental to successful 
governance. 
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